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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
—000O000-
BUSHCO, d.b.a Babydolls 
Escorts, et al. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
et al., 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Appeal No: 20070559-SC 
-000O000-
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2 (j). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is Utah Code Ann. Title 59 Chapter 27 a content- based regulation which 
violates the rights of Defendants to free speech under The First Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Motion for summary 
Judgment herein. R. 738-786. Review of summary Judgment is a review of legal 
conclusions; and the review is for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America. 
Inc.. 814 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
2. What standard of Review is correct, in determining the constitutionality of 
this act? 
This issue was preserved for appeal by Plaintiffs Motion for summary 
Judgment herein. R. 738-786. Review of Summary Judgment is a review of legal 
conclusions; and the review is for correctness. Schurtz v. BMW of North America. 
Inc.. 814P.2d 1108 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND ORDINANCES AT 
ISSUE 
Pertinent Constitutional and statutory provisions, including the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, and Utah Code Ann. Title 59 
Chapter 27, and the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, Title 78 Chapter 33 are included 
in the Appendix hereto. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case 
This is a facial challenge to Utah Code Ann. Title 59 chapter 27, which levies 
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a 10% "gross receipts tax" on "sexually explicit businesses and escort services". 
Plaintiffs are businesses which feature nude or semi-nude dancers, or which provide 
escort services, and which either are, or might become, subject to the tax. Plaintiffs 
contend that the tax is a content-based "burden" on their rights to free expression 
under the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This action is brought under the 
Utah Declaratory Judgment Act, § 78-33-2 U.C.A. The trial court originally ruled 
that it had no jurisdiction to hear this matter, as Plaintiffs had not exhausted their 
administrative remedies before the Utah State Tax Commission. That ruling was 
reversed by the Court of Appeals in TDM. Inc. v. Tax Commission 2004 UT App 
433,103 P.3d 190 (Utah App. 2004); Cert Denied 109 P.3d 804 (Utah 2005), which 
remanded this case for a decision on the merits. The District Court then granted 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, ruling that the statute is not content 
based, but is a proper response to the problem of "negative secondary effects". 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In 2004, the Utah Legislature passed HB 239 entitled "Sexually Explicit 
Business and Escort Service Tax", and enacting Utah Code Ann. Title 59 Chapter 27. 
R. 16-23. Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-102 defines an "escort" as "any individual who 
is available to the public for the purpose of accompanying another individual for 
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companionship" and obtains a fee for such service. An "escort service" is defined as 
"any person who furnishes or arranges for an escort to accompany another individual 
for companionship" for a fee. R. 17-18. The same section defines a "nude or 
partially denuded individual" as someone "with any of the following less than 
completely and opaquely covered: (a) genitals; (b) the pubic region; or (c) a female 
breast below a point immediately from the top of areola." A "sexually explicit 
business" is defined as "a business at which any nude or partially denuded individual, 
regardless of whether the nude or partially denuded individual is an employee of the 
sexually explicit business or an independent contractor, provides any service" for a 
fee, and for at least 30 days during a calendar year." Id 
§ 59-27-103 enacts a tax "equal to 10% of amounts paid to, or charged by, 
sexually explicit businesses as defined therein. § 59-27-104 of the Act enacts a 
similar tax for escort agencies. The tax is to be a "gross receipts tax" on all income 
for the businesses defined in the Act. R. 18-20. § 59-27-106 requires businesses 
subject to the tax to maintain adequate books and records to enable Defendants to 
levy and collect the taxes. R.21. Pursuant to § 59-27-105, certain portions of the 
money raised are earmarked for investigation or treatment of sex offenses or 
offenders. R. 20-21. 
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At the House Committee hearing, held on February 3,2004, the bill's sponsor, 
Rep. Duane Bordeaux, was joined by Kathy Okey, an employee of the Department 
of Corrections. While Ms. Okey appeared to testify as an expert on sex offenders, she 
was not introduced as such, and presented no credentials which would lead an 
average person ro bleive she had such expertise. Rep. Bordeaux spoke of a need for 
more therapy resources for sex offenders, and said: "A special tax for a special 
purpose is not a regressive tax, nor does it place a burden on disadvantaged 
populations." R. 130. Ms. Okey spoke of the number of offenders and the need in the 
correction system for more funding for therapy. She stated, concerning convicted sex 
offenders: "Without additional funding for treatment, it makes it an increased danger 
to the community." R. 131. Ms. Okey also said: 
I also think it important to point out that there is a cause and effect here. While 
most people who utilize sexually explicit businesses don't commit sex 
offenses, the vast majority of sex offenders utilize these kinds of services. So 
there is a cause and effect there that perhaps they should pay some of that 
burden. There was an analysis done by Hanson and Busia [apparently should 
be "Hanson and Bussiere"] of sex offenders in the United States, Canada and 
Great Britain. The third top factor that indicates a sex offender's risk is 
paraphilias. Utilizing these types of services in one example of paraphilias. 
R.133-134. 
In answer to a question about the term she used, she defined the term "paraphilia" as 
follows: 
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A paraphilia is an unusual sexual interest that you really have an obsession 
with. The ones that most people joke about is like women's shoes or feathers 
or those kinds of things would be examples. But it is an unusual interest in 
something. It's not necessarily illegal but generally people [who] have one 
type of that kind of interest also have others. With sex offenders, it's one of 
the things that it's a huge risk factor for them. R. 134. 
In answer to a question as to whether there was evidence that sex offenders 
used escort services, Ms. Okey stated further: 
Accessing escort services or stripper bars is a type of paraphilia and they didn't 
divide at this percentage. It's just that paraphilia is one of the top contributors 
when you are looking if someone is going to re-offend. If they have paraphilia, 
this, it's one of the top things that you look at. T. 138. 
Upon passage, and at the request of the sponsor, the House added intent 
language to buttress that position after the bill had passed the Utah House of 
Representatives: 
It is the intent of this act to tax sexually explicit businesses and escort services 
to provide a revenue for treating individuals who have been convicted of sex 
offenses. The provisions of this act have neither the intent nor the effect of 
imposing a limitation or restriction on the content of any communicative 
material, including sexually oriented materials. Similarly it is not the intent nor 
the effect of the act to restrict or deny access by adults to sexually oriented 
materials protected by the First Amendment. Or to deny access by the 
distributers and exhibitor of sexually oriented entertainment to their intended 
market. Neither is the intent nor the effect of this act to condone or legitimize 
the distribution of obscene material. 
For the legislature finds the Supreme Court of the United State has upheld the 
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regulation of sexually oriented businesses because of the deleterious effect they 
have on the community. Sexually oriented business, it is in the best interest of 
the citizens of this state to provide counseling to individuals who have 
committed a sex offense. Most sex offenders continue to commit sex offenses 
if they do not receive treatment. Sex offender treatment is expensive. If an 
offender has to pay for treatment, restitution and normal living expenses, they 
generally cannot afford treatment. It is reasonable to tax sexually explicit 
businesses and escort services in order to provide counseling for individuals 
who have committed a sex offense. R. 126-127. 
Plaintiffs in this action originally included three semi-nude dancing 
establishments licensed by the State of Utah to present such entertainment in 
conjunction with the sale of alcoholic beverages, as they were among businesses 
which received notices that they were likely to be subject to the tax, and should 
commence paying the tax with their sales tax payments. Defendants later conceded 
that Plaintiffs who had valid liquor licenses from the State, and who were in 
compliance with the "dress requirements" set by the State, should not be subject to 
the tax. R. 601. These requirements include that the nipple and areole be opaquely 
covered, as well as a prohibition on the displaying of the " genitals, pubic area and 
anus." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-602. The Tax Commission made a similar 
determination concerning American Bush, Inc., which does not deal in alcoholic 
beverages, but observes similar rules regarding the dress of performers. According 
to correspondence from Defendant's counsel, the decisions of the Tax Commission 
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not to impose the tax on these Plaintiffs and former Plaintiffs "was not based on the 
type of dancing but rather on the amount of dress." R.602-603. 
American Bush, Inc. previously featured full nudity in its dancing, but was 
required to restrict its dancers to semi-nude under an ordinance passed in 2001. 
American Bush now complies with costume requirements which would be required 
of establishments which sell alcoholic beverages. This party, however, seeks to 
comply only with the less restrictive Ordinance requirements, without being subject 
to this additional tax. R. 1080-1083. Defendants have made it clear that a change in 
the attire would trigger the tax. Plaintiff Denali, L.L.C. does present a dance show 
in Salt Lake City featuring full nudity. As such, it is the only establishment of which 
Plaintiffs are aware, in the State of Utah, subject to the "sexually explicit business" 
tax based solely on the lack of adequate attire on its dancers. R. 1177-1180. 
Plaintiffs Bushco, Inc., and Valley Recreation, Inc., provide services, on an 
individual basis, of entertainers and escorts as defined by the Salt Lake CityM Sexually 
Oriented Business "SOB" ordinance, Title 5, Chapter 60 of the Salt Lake City Code. 
(Bush and Reynolds Aff s.) Plaintiff D. House, L.L.C, at the time this action was 
filed, provided services, on an individual basis, of entertainers and escorts as licensed 
by the City of Park City. (Curtis Aff.) This Plaintiff has now relocated to Midvale, 
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in Salt Lake County, and is licensed by that City under its SOB Ordinance. These 
Plaintiffs filed affidavits which stated that their services were similar to those of the 
other establishments. Joe Bush, in behalf of Plaintiff Bushco, stated: 
4. That he also supplies entertainers for bachelor parties and other events, and 
this constitutes a substantial part of his business. This entertainment is 
primarily dancing entertainment similar to that provided by other Plaintiffs in 
their establishments. 
5. That he believes his business contains expressive elements protected by the 
First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as well as elements of free 
association, also protected by the Constitution. R. 320. 
Based on the affidavits, the trial Court ruled that: 
The escort service Plaintiffs are entitled to First Amendment protection 
because they incorporate dancing services; thus for purposes of these cross-
motions all the Plaintiffs will be treated as if they are entitled to the same First 
Amendment protection. R. 1207. 
The trial Court nevertheless ruled in favor of Defendants; as it found the law not to 
infringe on those First Amendment rights. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
This an action seeking to declare the "Sexually Explicit Business and Escort 
Service Tax unconstitutional as a violation of the First Amendment. Nude and semi-
nude dancing has constitutional protection from "content based" regulation. Further, 
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this act is overbroad as it taxes the right to free expression and includes much 
constitutionally protected activity. 
The "Power to tax is the power to destroy" and this act is unlawful censorship. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that a content based tax violates the 
First Amendment and cannot be sustained. 
Because this is a content based tax, it is to be reviewed by the Courts using 
strict scrutiny. Such strict scrutiny allows the tax to be sustained only if it is 
necessary to serve a compelling state interest, and is narrowly drawn to achieve that 
interest. This tax does not meet that high standard as the target of the tax is not 
necessary to, or reasonably related to, the goal of raising revenue. 
The tax is not aimed at "negative secondary effects" and is not designed to 
eliminate or lessen those effects. Therefore, it does not meet the requirements of 
"intermediate scrutiny", and cannot be upheld on that basis. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
NUDE AND SEMI-NUDE DANCING IS PROTECTED UNDER THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
This Court refused to recognize nude dancing as expression for purposes of 
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State Constitutional protections under Article I § 15, in American Bush v. City of 
South Salt Lake. 2006 UT 40, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2006). Inexplicably, this Court 
seemed to repudiate a long line of cases where the Court invited litigants to argue the 
merits of their claims under the Constitution of Utah, and in which the Court 
previously stated that the protection of Article I § 15 is "by its terms somewhat 
broader than the federal clause". Provo City v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456 (Utah 
1989). Nevertheless, in West v. Thomson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999, 1005-1006 
(Utah 1994), this Court recognized the "primacy model" in which Federal 
constitutional protections form a "broad uniform' floor' or uniform level of protection 
that State law must respect." Therefore, whatever personal opinions are held by 
members of this Court regarding the merits of nude dancing as artistic expression, it 
must be recognized as subject to First Amendment protection. Furthermore, this case 
can be distinguished from American Bush v. South Salt Lake as this law is aimed at 
all nudity in entertainment, and is much wider in its application. As will be shown, 
this Court should have little trouble holding that the instant statute is 
unconstitutionally overbroad without revisiting its previous ruling. The South Salt 
Lake "Sexually Oriented Business" Ordinance at issue there surely was content-
based. But it was directed only at adult businesses which were claimed to cause or 
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exacerbate the dreaded"secondary effects". 
The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on a number of occasions that speech need 
not be political to be protected by the First Amendment. See Winters v. New York, 
333 U.S. 507 (1948) (fiction in magazines) and Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 
(1952) (movies). And expression is protected even when not verbal. See Tinker v. 
Pes Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) and Texas v. Johnson, 
491 U.S. 367 (1989). The Court, in California v. LaRue. 409 U.S. 109 0972) ruled 
that dancing, like theatrical productions, might be entitled to First Amendment 
protection. In that case, however, the Court upheld an ordinance regulating dancing 
or performances in an establishment licensed to sell alcoholic beverages, under the 
Twenty-first Amendment, which gives State the power to regulate alcoholic 
beverages. In the case of Doran v. Salem Inn. Inc.. 422 U.S. 922 (1975), the Court 
recognized First Amendment protection for topless dancing in places not selling 
alcohol. The Court, however, indicated that there are limited protections for such 
types of dancing. The Court said: 
Although the customary "bar room" type of nude dancing may involve only the 
barest minimum of protected expression, we recognized in California v. 
LaRue, 409 U.S. 109,118,93 S.Ct. 390,397,34 L.Ed. 2d 342 (1972), that this 
form of entertainment might be entitled to First and Fourteenth Amendment 
protection under some circumstances. 
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In the present case, the challenged ordinance applies not merely to places 
which serve liquor, but to many other establishments as well. The District 
Court observed, we believe correctly: 
The local ordinance here attacked not only prohibits topless dancing 
in bars but also prohibits any female from appearing in "any public 
place" with uncovered breasts. There is no limit to the interpretation of 
the term "any public place" it could include the theatre, town hall, opera 
house, as well as a public market place, street or any place of assembly, 
indoors or outdoors. Thus, the ordinance would prohibit the 
performance of the "Ballet Africans'" and a number of other works of 
unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance. 364 
F.Supp. at 483. 422 U.S. at 931. 
The Court invalidated the ordinance prohibiting nude dancing without alcohol, 
as overbroad as it would also apply to more "artistic" productions. This is exactly the 
case this Court is faced with here. The statute at issue is not directed at the 
"customary 'bar room' type of nude dancing [that] may involve only the barest 
minimum of protected expression". Instead, it is directed at any production which 
may involve nudity, as will be explored more fully below. 
In the case of 44 Liquor Mart. Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 116 S.Ct. 
1495 (1996), the Supreme Court explicitly overruled California v. LaRue, and stated: 
Without questioning the holding in LaRue. we now disavow its reasoning 
insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment. As we explained in a case 
decided more than a decade after LaRue. although the Twenty-first 
Amendment limits the effect of the dormant Commerce Clause on a State's 
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regulatory power over the delivery or use of intoxicating beverages within its 
borders,"the Amendment does not license the States to ignore their obligations 
under other provisions of the Constitution." 116 S.Ct. at 1514. 
The question of nude dancing as protected expression was again addressed by 
the Supreme Court in Schad v. Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61 (1981). In this case, an 
adult bookstore expanded its facility to include live nude dancing. The Borough of 
Mount Ephraim, New Jersey outlawed any such entertainment. The Supreme Court 
found the ordinance overbroad in that it would prohibit much constitutionally 
protected expression, as would the instant law. The Doran and Schad decisions 
continue to be quoted with approval, through the most recent nude dancing cases. 
Federal courts have allowed "reasonable time, place and manner restrictions" 
on businesses featuring nude dancing. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre. Inc., 501 U.S. 560 
(1991)and City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. 529 U.S. 277 (2000), Once again, both the 
plurality and the dissent cited approvingly both Doran and Schad. The plurality 
opinion of Justice O'Connor stated: 
As we explained in Barnes, however, nude dancing of the type at issue here is 
expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer ambit 
of the First Amendment's protection. See Barnes v. Glen Theater. Inc.. 501 
U.S. at 565-566 (plurality opinion); Schad v. Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61,66 
(1981). 
To determine what level of scrutiny applies to the ordinance at issue here, we 
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must decide "whether the State's regulation is related to the suppression of 
expression." Texas v. Johnson. 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989); See also United 
States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. at 377. If the governmental purpose in enacting the 
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of expression, then the regulation 
need only satisfy the "less stringent" standard from O'Brien for evaluating 
restrictions on symbolic speech. Texas v. Johnson. Supra, at 403; United 
States v. O'Brien. Supra, at 377. If the government interest is related to the 
content of the expression, however, then the regulation falls outside the scope 
of the O'Brien test and must be justified under a more demanding standard. 
Texas v. Johnson. Supra, at 403. 529 U.S. at 289. 
The Court then went on to look at the ordinance of the City of Erie. In doing 
so, the Court noted: 
The ordinance here, like the statute in Barnes, is on its face a general 
prohibition on public nudity. 553 Pa., at 354, 719 A.2d, at 277. By its terms, 
the ordinance regulates conduct alone. It does not target nudity that contains 
an erotic message: rather it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that 
nudity is accompanied by expressive activity. And like the statute in Barnes, 
the Erie ordinance replaces and updates provisions of an "Indecency and 
Immorality" ordinance that has been on the books since 1866, predating the 
prevalence of nude dancing establishments such as Kandyland. IcL at 290. 
(Emphasis added). 
The statute at issue here is directed at nudity that is "accompanied by 
expressive activity"; and it does not apply only to adult businesses featuring nude or 
semi-nude dancing. It does not purport to affect public nudity. The Seventh Circuit 
Court, in Schultz v. City of Cumberland. 228 F.3d 831 (7th Cir. 2000), a case 
involving fully nude dancing, decided after City of Erie, said: 
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Although once furiously debated, it is now well-established that erotic dancing 
of the sort practiced at the Island Bar enjoys constitutional protection as 
expressive conduct. See City of Erie v. Pap's A.M.. U.S. , 120 S.Ct. 
1382, 1385 (2000); Miller v. Civil City of South Bend. 904 F.2d 1081, 1087 
(7th Cir. 1990), rev'd sub nom. on other grounds, Barnes v. Glen Theatre. Inc.. 
501 U.S. 560 (1991). Of course, no one argues that erotic dancing at the Island 
Bar represents high artistic expression, but "[n]ude barroom dancing, though 
lacking in artistic value, and expressing ideas and emotions different from 
those of more mainstream dances, communicates them, to some degree 
nonetheless." Miller. 904 F.2d at 1087. The Supreme Court has agreed, 
explaining that "nude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, 
although . . . it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's 
protection." Erie. 120 S.Ct. at 1391 (addressing nude barroom dancing); see 
also Barnes. 501 U.S. at 566 (u[N]ude dancing of the kind sought to be 
performed here is expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First 
Amendment, though we view it as only marginally so."). Moreover, "[s]exual 
expression which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First 
Amendment." Sable Communications of California. Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 
115, 126 (1989). Entertainment may not be prohibited "solely because it 
displays the nude human figure. '[N]udity alone' does not place otherwise 
protected material outside the mantle of the First Amendment." Schad v. 
Borough of Mount Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981) (citations omitted). 228 
F.3dat839. 
Despite challenging some of the assertions by the City concerning an ordinance 
targeted at nude dancing, the Court approved the "de minimus" requirement that 
dancers wear pasties and g-strings. See, however, Nakatomi Investments. Inc. v. City 
of Schenectady. 949 F.Supp. 988 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) which discusses at length the 
"content-based" censorship efforts which attempt to differentiate between "barroom-
type" nude dancing and "real" art, such as ballet, and which invalidated an ordinance 
16 
designed to prohibit fully nude dancing in adult establishments. The recent Eleventh 
Circuit case of Peek-A-Boo Lounge of Bradenton v. Manatee County. 337 F.3d 1251 
(11th Cir. 2003) gave thorough treatment to the legal history, and constitutional 
protection, of exotic dancing. Litigation continues over whether the specter of 
"secondary effects" may restrict dance establishments from full nudity in their 
presentation, but the question does seem settled that there are First Amendment 
implications which will affect the ability of the State to directly tax the message. 
POINT II 
THE TAX IS A VIOLATION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. IT IS A CONTENT 
BASED BURDEN ON FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO FREE EXPRESSION; 
AND IT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY OVERBROAD. 
This Court has supported a broad use of the Utah Declaratory Judgment Act 
to "determine a question of construction or validity arising under, inter alia 'a statute 
[or a] municipal ordinance."9 Utah Rest. Ass'n v. Davis Cty. Bd. Of Health, 709 P.2d 
1159, 1161 (Utah 1985). In order for a declaratory judgment to be granted, there 
must be "a justiciable controversy based upon an accrued set of facts, an actual 
conflict, adverse parties, a legally protectable interest on the plaintiffs part, and an 
issue ripe for judicial resolution." Barnard v. Utah State Bar, 857 P.2d 917 (Utah 
1993). Certainly this dispute meets all of those specifications. 
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This is a facial attack on the tax statute in its entirety on the grounds that the 
tax violates the rights of Plaintiffs and others under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. This Court has the power to review the acts of the Utah 
Legislature and to determine whether those acts are within the constitutional power 
of the legislature to enact. State v. Green. 2004 UT 76, 99 P.3d 820 (Utah 2004). 
Plaintiffs ask this Court to declare Title 59 Chapter 27 U.C. A. as enacted by the 2004 
Utah Legislature, unconstitutional in its entirety, and therefore null and void. 
Further, Plaintiffs are entitled to assert the rights of those not before the Court 
under Provo City v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455 (Utah 1989). There, this Court dealt with 
a facial challenge to a City ordinance, based on First Amendment violations. § 
12.45.010 of the Revised Ordinances of Provo City provided: 
UNLAWFUL SEX ACTS.(a) it shall be unlawful for any person in public or 
in a public place, to exhibit or expose his or her genitals, or to engage in, or to 
solicit another to engage in, any sexual conduct as defined herein. Id at 456, 
fn.L 
The Court discussed the issue of standing to make a facial challenge: 
One aspect of general standing doctrine we share with the federal courts is the 
basic requirement that the complainant show 'some distinct and palpable 
injury that gives him [or her] a personal stake in the outcome of the legal 
dispute."5 There is no question that Willden meets this standing test. He has 
been convicted and sentenced under the ordinance he challenges. He 
indisputably has standing to challenge the ordinance, at least as it has been 
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applied to him. 
However, Willden's challenge is more sweeping. He contends that the 
ordinance as written sweeps so broadly in its prohibitions that it criminalizes 
behavior protected by the first amendment and, therefore, should be struck 
down as being invalid on its face, even if his particular conduct could properly 
be criminalized. In support of his claim of standing to challenge the ordinance 
on its face - in effect, to assert the first amendment rights of others not before 
the court whose conduct could not be criminalized consistent with the first 
amendment Willden relies on the federal first amendment "overbreadth" 
standing doctrine, designed to give standing to anyone who is subject to an 
overbroad statute that chills the exercise of first amendment rights of others. 
The rational for granting such standing is that the constitutionally protected 
interests infringed by such statutes are so important that their protection need 
not await the perfect plaintiff. (Internal Citations omitted) 768 P.2d at 457. 
The overbreadth doctrine in First Amendment cases was explained in 
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 609(1973): 
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space 
and that statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First 
"Amendment rights must be narrowly drawn and represent a considered 
legislative judgment that a particular mode of expression has to give way to 
together compelling needs of society. Herndon v. Lowry. 301 U.S. 242, 258 
(9137); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960); Grayned v. City of 
Rockford. 408 U.S., at 116-117. As a corollary, the Court has altered its 
traditional rules of standing to permit - in the First Amendment area - "attacks 
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack 
demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn 
with the requisite narrow specificity." Dombrowski v. Pfister, 3 80 U.S., at 486. 
Litigants, therefore, are permitted to challenge a statute because their own right 
of free expression are violated, but because of a judicial prediction or 
assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the 
court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. 
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(Emphasis Added). 
Appellant American Bush, Inc. challenges the tax that would be imposed if 
it reduced the amount of attire worn by its dancers, as it is allowed to do under the 
controlling Ordinance in South Salt Lake. It has been exempted from the tax by 
Defendants, based on the attire being worn at the present time. The tax is, by 
definition, content-based. The First Amendment rights of the escort agency 
Appellants have been recognized by the District Court in its ruling above, and by the 
cities under which they are licensed to provide services. The Salt Lake City 
"Sexually Oriented Business (SOB) Ordinance provides: 
5.61.085 LEGITIMATE ARTISTIC MODELING. 
A. The city does not intend to unreasonably or improperly prohibit legitimate 
modeling which may occur in a state of nudity for purposes protected by the 
first amendment or similar state protections. The city does intend to prohibit 
prostitution and related offenses occurring under the guise of nude modeling. 
Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection 5.61.21 OK of this chapter, a 
licensed outcall employee may appear in a state of nudity before a customer or 
patron providing that a written contract for such appearance was entered into 
between the customer or patron and the employee and signed at least twenty 
four (24) hours before the nude appearance. All of the other applicable 
provisions of this chapter shall still apply to such nude appearances. 
B. In the event of a contract for nude modeling or appearance signed more than 
forty eight (48) hours in advance of the modeling or appearance, the individual 
to appear nude shall not be required to obtain a license pursuant to this chapter. 
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The performance restrictions legitimatize a performance by a fully nude model, 
dancer or performer, under certain circumstances. The City has thus recognized First 
Amendment protections for even sexually-charged performances involving full 
nudity. See the similar provisions of §5.56.060 of the Midvale City Code; §28A-8 of 
the Murray City Code, §4-9-8 of the Park City Code and §5.136.085 of the Salt Lake 
County Code. 
The challenge to this statute is based on the fact that it is targeted towards 
protected First Amendment activity; and it is done so in a cynical attempt to impose 
censorship on activity of which a majority of the legislature disapproves. A more 
general tax used to raise the money sought for therapy and for other purposes of 
rehabilitation and public safety, would be constitutionally sound; but one which is 
directed narrowly at disapproved content violates the constitution. Certainly, an 
earmarked tax such as the Zoo, Arts and Parks tax (ZAP) is a valid use of the taxing 
power. The ZAP tax, of course, is aimed evenly at ah similar businesses. It does not 
allow the Tax Commission to single out only the businesses where "decent people" 
would not go. It does not punish people on the basis of a perceived propensity to do 
evil. If a reasonably calculated tax were levied on all personal services and/or all 
entertainment in the State, Plaintiffs would feel vindicated. Until then, they urge this 
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Court to declare the law at issue an unconstitutional invasion of their rights and an 
unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process of law, in violation of 
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution of Utah. Plaintiffs also seek a refund of all amounts paid by any 
Plaintiff herein to the Tax Commission pursuant to the terms of the Act. The U. S. 
Supreme Court has held that "the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even 
minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury." Elrod vs. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 377 (1976). This Court must determine that the statute is an 
unconstitutional burden on Plaintiffs' free speech rights, and that it subjects the free 
speech of the public at large to a constitutionally impermissible "chill". 
The Tax Commission has so far only attempted to apply this tax to "adult 
businesses. "Legitimate" artists may feel safe from this tax. The Tax Commission 
might not pursue an art school or a "legitimate theater" to pay this tax, because their 
clientele are a "better class of people". Such assumptions are constitutionally infirm 
and there is no support in the statutory language for making such distinctions.1 
1
 The Republican Caucus in the Utah House of 
Representatives announced in l a t e 2005, a paid "speed dating" 
event in which lobbyis t s would pay for "face time" with 
individual l e g i s l a t o r s . Deseret News, Dec. 2, 2005. Some have 
suggested tha t t h i s amounts to an unlicensed escor t serv ice . 
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Because the tax is thus clearly aimed at the message, and not at "secondary effects", 
the law is subject to strict scrutiny. 
During hearings before the Utah House Committee on Revenue and Taxation, 
a question was asked as to whether the tax would be applied to a theater that might 
feature nudity in one of its plays. The sponsor, of course, indicated that was not likely 
R. 135-136. He gave no basis for his opinion; and the "plain language" of the Statute 
is to the contrary. If a commercial theatrical production features nudity for more than 
30 days, the tax measure by its terms applies to the theater, on a permanent basis, 
whether or not the nudity is featured in another play during that year. Likewise, if two 
theatrical releases had some nudity in them, and each only lasted 15 days, the theater 
would be branded, at least for the entire tax year, and quite possibly on a permanent 
basis. Counsel for Plaintiffs has attended at least one play at the Salt Lake Acting 
Company where there was brief nudity. The Capitol Theater hosted a production of 
the well known Broadway play, "Oh Calcutta" which featured an abundance of 
nudity. While the theater itself is owned by the County and may be exempt from the 
tax, the company that produced the musical was privately owned. If a play similar to 
"Oh Calcutta" stayed for at least a month, the company that presented it would be 
subject to the tax, by its terms. Likewise, Kingsbury Hall at the University of Utah 
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played host to a revival of the irreverent 60fs musical "Hair" which has a nude scene. 
The play was privately produced, although the theater belongs to the State. Once 
again, the tax would apply by its terms if the play stayed for a month, or two such 
separate productions were held within a calendar year. 
While there are no "landed clubs" affiliated with the American Association of 
Nude Recreation (formerly American Sunbathing Association) in Utah at this time, 
the tax obviously would affect such old line "nudist camps" if one attempted to open 
in Utah. A friend of counsel's recently agreed to do occasional nude modeling for a 
private art school in the Salt Lake Valley for serious art students. The tax clearly 
applies if such modeling is done for more than 30 days during a calendar year. 
The Tax Commission may not to attempt to tax these entities, as it has only sent 
notices to those who it has determined are in the "adult entertainment" business. That 
is despite the fact that the law imposes the tax on all those who perform an service 
while in a State of nudity, for 30 days out of the year. Seemingly, the only basis for 
such a decision would be the value judgment that nudity at an art school is "good" 
and nudity (or semi-nudity) at a bar or other adult entertainment facility is "bad". See 
again Nakatomi Investments. The tax is constitutionally overbroad, as it covers 
much constitutionally protected behavior. As in Doran, the act "would prohibit [tax] 
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the performance of the "Ballet Africans'" and a number of other works of 
unquestionable artistic and socially redeeming significance." Courts that have upheld 
prohibitions on nude dancing have clearly focused on "the customary 'bar room" type 
of nude dancing" (Doran); " erotic dancing of the sort practiced at the Island Bar" 
(Schultz); " nude dancing of the type at issue here" (City of Erie). This statute does 
not confine itself to such venues. It aims directly at nudity, in whatever form it may 
appear; and as such it is in violation of the First Amendment. 
Perhaps the most insidious thing about the tax is the cavalier attitude the 
Defendants are allowed take. They will tax who they please; and they will change 
their minds about who is included whenever it pleases them. The Supreme Court has 
rejected regulations where "unbridled discretion" to issue a business license has been 
left to the licensing authority. In FW/PBS. Inc. v. Dallas. 493 U.S. 215 (1990) the 
Court said: 
It is settled by a long line of recent decisions of this Court that an ordinance 
which ... makes the peaceful enjoyment of freedoms which the Constitution 
guarantees contingent upon on the uncontrolled will of an official — as by 
requiring a permit or license which may be granted or withheld in the 
discretion of such official — is an unconstitutional censorship or prior restraint 
upon the enjoyment of those freedoms. 493 U.S. at 226. 
See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147(1969) and Lakewood v. 
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Plain Dealer Publishing Co.. 486 U.S. 750, 759 (1988) where the Court said: 
Therefore, a facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government 
official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or view 
point of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers. 
Because the tax obviously gives the State Tax Commission leeway to decide between 
the agood guys" and the "bad guys", it is censorship, viewpoint discrimination and 
prior restraint in its worst form. Clearly this statute is overbroad by its terms. And 
just as clearly, Defendants will apply it as they seem fit, from time to time. If a 
"legitimate" theatre features nudity in a production, maybe they will be taxed; and 
maybe they won't. There appears to be no way to tell; and this fact constitutes a 
substantial "chill" on First Amendment rights. The tax should be stricken in its 
entirety as wholly inconsistent with First Amendment principles. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD USE A STRICT SCRUTINY STANDARD TO REVIEW 
THIS STATUTE. 
The Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel, attached a note to the bill 
as introduced, dated December 22, 2003: 
This bill imposes a tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services, and 
might be challenged as violating the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. The U.S. Supreme Court has not decided a case addressing 
taxation of sexually explicit businesses or escort services, but has decided 
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cases involving a tax on other activities protected by the First Amendment. 
Under those rulings, if this bill is challenged, a court would first determine 
whether sexually explicit businesses and escort services are obscene, and not 
protected by the First Amendment. If a court decides they are not obscene, and 
are therefore protected by the First Amendment, the court could uphold the bill 
if the court determined that the tax is necessary to serve a compelling state 
interest, and is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest. (Emphasis added). 
R.83. 
Semi-nude dancing in bars has long been approved by statute; and 
establishments featuring such dancing have been determined by Defendants not to be 
subject to this tax. Plaintiffs know of no attempt anywhere to determine that such 
dancing, or nude dancing, which is, or has been, specifically licensed by the State or 
its subdivisions, is obscene. The legislature's own attorneys agree that this law deals 
with expressive conduct which is protected by the First Amendment. According to 
them, it is thus subject to strict scrutiny, and will not be upheld without a showing of 
a compelling State interest. The legislature struggled to show such an interest by 
inserting intent language. This language does nothing to save this bill from itself. 
There is no explanation of the statement that it "is reasonable to tax sexually explicit 
businesses. . . in order to provide counseling". There is no attempt to explain the 
definition of "sexually explicit entertainment", which includes much constitutionally 
protected material. The burden to the State to sustain such a statement is very high; 
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and the State has made no real attempt to meet it. 
The U.S. Supreme Court, back in 1819, stated: "That the power of taxing it by 
the States may be exercised so as to destroy it, is too obvious to be denied." 
McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 427 (1819). From that, we get the 
oft repeated statement that "the power to tax is the power to destroy." Since then, 
the Supreme Court has stricken several attempts to tax speech, as a violation of the 
First Amendment. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania. 319 U.S. 105 (1943) the Court 
invalidated a license law which required members of the Jehovah's Witnesses to 
obtain a license before distribution pamphlets from door to door. While the 
Witnesses asked for a set contribution for the pamphlets, they often gave them away 
to interested persons. The Court said : 
The First Amendment, which the Fourteenth makes applicable to the states, 
declares that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech or of the press . . . " It could hardly be denied that a tax laid specifically 
on the exercise of those freedoms would be unconstitutional. Yet the license 
tax imposed by this Ordinance is in substance just that. 319 U.S. at 108. 
In Minneapolis Star v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev..460 U.S. 575, 586 (1983), 
the Supreme Court invalidated a "use tax" on paper and ink used by newspapers. In 
doing so, the Court said: 
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Further, differential treatment, unless justified by some special characteristic 
of the press, suggests that the goal of the regulation is not unrelated to the 
suppression of expression and such a goal is presumptively unconstitutional. 
See, e.g., Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely. 408 U.S. 92,95-96 (1972); 
cf. Brown v. Hartlage. 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (First Amendment has its "fullest 
and most urgent" application in the case of regulation of the content of political 
speech). Differential taxation of the press, then, places such a burden on the 
interests protected by the First Amendment that we cannot countenance such 
treatment unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling 
importance that it cannot achieve without differential taxation. (Emphasis 
added). 
The main interest asserted by Minnesota in this case is the raising of revenue. 
Of course that interest is critical to any government. Standing alone, however, 
it cannot justify the special treatment of the press, for an alternative means of 
achieving the same interest without raising concerns under the First 
Amendment is clearly available; the State could raise the revenue by taxing 
businesses generally, avoiding the censorial threat implicit in a tax that singles 
out the press. 
The Supreme Court, in Arkansas Writers1 Project, Inc. v. Ragland. 481 U.S. 
221 (1987), invalidated a discriminatory tax on certain magazines, in the State of 
Arkansas. There, the Court held: 
As we stated in that case, f,[t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based 
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to 
prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic." 481 U.S. at 230. 
The Court reiterated that such a tax must pass strict scrutiny: 
...the State must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
State interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Id. at 231. 
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The Supreme Court, in Simon & Schuster v. Crime Victims Bd.. 502 U.S. 105 
(1991), stated that: 
A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes 
a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech. As we 
emphasized in invalidating a content-based magazine tax, "official scrutiny of 
the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely 
incompatible with the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press." 
This is a notion so ingrained in our First Amendment jurisprudence that last 
Term, we found it so "obvious" as to not require explanation. It is but one 
manifestation of a far broader principle: "Regulations which permit the 
Government to discriminate on the basis of the content of the message cannot 
be tolerated under the First Amendment." 502 U.S. at 115-116. (Emphasis 
added). 
The Court there found the New York State "Son of Sam" law to be a content-
based statute, because "it singles out income derived from expressive activity for a 
burden the State places on no other income, and is directed only at works with a 
specified content." Id at 116. The expressive activity in this case is dancing, and 
the discrimination is against the forum used, that of an establishment which features 
nudity "during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive [sic] days during a calendar 
year". The burden is not restricted to the nude dancing itself, as the tax continues 
even if the venue changes its fare after 30 days. The Supreme Court, in Simon & 
Schuster, imposed the compelling interest test on the State, and found it lacking. 
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Such a test should also be imposed here, and such an interest has not been shown. 
In the more recent case of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.. 535 U.S. 425, 
445 (2002) Justice Kennedy, concurring in the result and providing the fifth vote to 
support the plurality, cited Arkansas Writers, and applied the principles to a zoning 
ordinance affecting adult businesses: 
On the other hand, a city may not regulate the secondary effects of speech by 
suppressing the speech itself. A city may not, for example, impose a content 
based fee or tax. This is true even if the government purports to justify the fee 
by reference to the secondary effects. Though the inference may be inexorable 
that a city could reduce secondary effects by reducing speech, this is not a 
permissible strategy. The purpose and effect of a zoning ordinance must be to 
reduce secondary effects and not to reduce speech.(Internal citations omitted) 
(Emphasis added). 
Under the rule of Marks v. United States. 430 U.S. 188 (1977), the opinion of Justice 
Kennedy is effectively the opinion of the Court; and this statement is fully supported 
by the numerous decisions of the Court cited above. 
Licensing fees for adult businesses have been upheld when those fees have 
some relationship to the cost of regulating the businesses. The concerns expressed 
by the legislature here certainly do not directly relate to the cost of such regulation. 
In TK's Video. Inc. v. Denton County. 24 F.3d 705, 710 (5th Cir. 1994) the Court 
upheld licensing fees for adult businesses and their employees but made it clear that 
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it would not sustain a tax such as this one: 
Government cannot tax First Amendment rights, but it can exact narrowly 
tailored fees to defray administrative costs of regulation. Cox v. New 
Hampshire. 312 U.S. 569.576-77,85 L.Ed. 1049.61 S.Ct. 762 (1941). Denton 
County requires each business and individual requesting a license to pay 
annual fees of $500 and $50 respectively. The district court found these 
amounts tied to the cost of investigating applicants and processing licenses. 
We agree. (Emphasis added). 
See also Acorn Investments. Inc. v. City of Seattle. 887 F.2d 219 (9th Cir. 
1989), also invalidating a discriminatory license tax involving adult businesses 
where the tax was not proved to be related to the costs of regulating those businesses. 
These rulings should not be a surprise in light of early American history, which tells 
us that the United States declared its Independence in part in rebellion over the hated 
"Stamp Act", which included a tax on newspapers, in a transparent attempt by the 
government to control the press.2 
The Court, in Boos v. Barry. 485 U.S. 312,320 (1988) distinguished between 
laws aimed at "secondary effects" and those which are content based and require 
strict scrutiny: 
Regulations that focus on the direct impact of speech on its audience present 
a different situation. Listeners' reactions to speech are not the type of 
2
 See The F i r s t Freedom: A His to ry of Free Speech by Robert 
Hargreaves . Sut ton Publ i sh ing (London 2002) pp. 114-115; 
206-207. 
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"secondary effects" we referred to in Renton. To take an example factually 
close to Renton, if the Ordinance there was justified by the City's desire to 
prevent the psychological damage it felt was associated with viewing adult 
movies, then analysis of the measure as a content-based statute would have 
been appropriate. The hypothetical regulation targets the direct impact of a 
particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be 
associated with that type of speech. 
The Supreme Court again, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group. 
529 U.S. 803 (2000) reviewed a censorship measure using strict scrutiny. The Court 
struck down a Federal statute which required cable systems to fully scramble or block 
channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" for a substantial 
part of each day, to avoid it being seen by children. The Court held: 
It is of no moment that the statute does not impose a complete prohibition. The 
distinction between laws burdening and laws banning speech is but a matter of 
degree. The Government's content-based burdens must satisfy the same 
rigorous scrutiny as its content-based bans. 
Since § 505 is content based, it can stand only if it satisfies strict scrutiny. 
E.g., Sable Communications of CaL Inc. v. FCC 492 U.S. 115, 126. If a 
statute regulates speech based on its content, it must be narrowly tailored to 
promote a compelling Government interest, and if a less restrictive alternative 
would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature must use that 
alternative. 529 U.S. at 812- 813. (Emphasis added). 
In the recent case of Ashcroft vs. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,253-
254,152 L.Ed.2d 403 (2002), the Court reviewed a Federal statute aimed at 
preventing child pornography and stated: 
The mere tendency of speech to encourage unlawful acts is not a sufficient 
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reason for banning it. The government "cannot constitutionally premise 
legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts." 
Stanley v.Georgia, 294 U.S. 557, 566, 89 S.Ct. 1243,22 L.Ed.2d 542 (1969). 
First Amendment freedoms are most in danger when the government seeks to 
control thought or justify its laws for that impermissible end. The right to 
think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the 
government because speech is the beginning of thought. 
The government may not prohibit speech because it increases the chances an 
unlawful act will be committed "at some indefinite future time." Hess v. 
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105,108,94 S.Ct. 326,38 L.Ed.2d 303 (1973) (per curiam). 
The government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech 
that might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse. 
Without a significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may 
not prohibit speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage 
in illegal conduct. 
As with the law stricken by the Court in the Free Speech Coalition case, the tax 
at issue here singles out speech for burden because of the supposed possibility that 
lawful speech may tend to influence the listener into inappropriate conduct; and this 
is an impermissible basis for banning (or taxing) that speech. See also Ward v. Rock 
Against Racism. 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) holding that the government "may not 
regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the burden on 
speech does not serve to advance its goals." Surely the State cannot justify this tax 
on the basis of any compelling State interest. Nor can it show that the statute is 
narrowly drawn to achieve that end, and not to unnecessarily interfere with 
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expression. 
The Supreme Court differentiated between secondary effects regulations, which 
require only "intermediate scrutiny", and "primary effects" regulations, which are 
subject to strict scrutiny, in Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union. 521 U.S. 844, 
867-868: 
In Renton, we upheld a zoning ordinance that kept adult movie theaters out of 
residential neighborhoods. The ordinance was aimed, not at the content of the 
films shown in the theaters, but rather at the "secondary effects" — such as 
crime and deteriorating property values ~ that these theaters fostered: "AIt is 
th[e] secondary effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the 
dissemination of "offensive" speech.'" According to the government, the CDA 
is constitutional because it constitutes a sort of "cyberzoning" on the internet. 
But the CDA applies broadly to the entire universe of cyberspace. And the 
purpose of the CDA is to protect children from the primary effects of 
"indecent" and "patently offensive" speech, rather than any secondary effects 
of such speech. Thus the CDA is a content-based blanket restriction on speech 
and, as such, cannot be "properly analyzed as a form of time, place and manner 
regulation." (Emphasis added). 
In U.S. Sound and Service. Inc. v. Township of Brick. 126 F.3d 555 (3rd Cir. 
1997), the Court, relying in part on Reno, struck down a zoning law aimed at a video 
store which would admittedly be selling or renting adult-oriented tapes. The trial 
court had used "intermediate scrutiny" under Renton, and upheld the restriction. The 
Court of Appeals found that analysis to be incorrect: 
The Township and the Board persuaded the district court that although the 
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regulation imposed by the Board's resolution singles out adult entertainment 
for special treatment, it is content-neutral because it is aimed not at the 
sexually explicit content but rather at the "secondary effect" of that 
entertainment on children. Accordingly, the court applied the intermediate 
scrutiny test of Renton. Intermediate scrutiny was not appropriate, however, 
because "[listeners1 reactions to speech are not the type of "secondary effects" 
referred to in Renton". (Emphasis added). 
The impact of protected speech on minors is a direct, rather than a secondary, 
effect, and a regulation that singles out non-obscene sexually explicit material 
because of its impact on minors is not content-neutral. 
Because the Township and the Board seek to justify the Board's resolution on 
the sole basis of a desire to protect minors from exposure to adult 
entertainment, Reno requires that we subject that resolution to strict scrutiny. 
The conclusion would not be different, however, if we were persuaded that 
Renton supplies the appropriate test. While protecting minors from exposure 
to adult entertainment can accurately be characterized as a compelling and 
substantial governmental interest, the regulation imposed by the Board's 
resolution is neither the least restrictive means of furthering that interest nor 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Accordingly, we conclude that the 
Board's resolution restricts protected speech in violation of U.S. Sound's right 
to free expression under the First Amendment. 126 F.3d at 558-9. 
On October 23, 2007, the Sixth Circuit, in Connection Distributing Co. v. 
Keisler. F.3d. , Case No. 06-3822 (6th Cir. October 23, 2007) facially 
invalidated 18 U.S.C. § 2257, which requires all producers of sexually explicit images 
to maintain records regarding the individuals depicted in the images, and to allow the 
Government to inspect those records without warning, during regular business hours. 
Like this tax, the regulation at issue there did not ban the speech; but the Court held 
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it was a substantial burden on the speech, and not justified by the "compelling 
government interest of fighting the scourge of child pornography": 
While the government is indeed aiming at conduct, child abuse, it is regulating 
protected speech, sexually explicit images of adults, to get at that conduct. To 
the extent the government is claiming that a law is considered a conduct 
regulation as long as the government claims an interest in conduct and not 
speech, the Supreme Court has rejected that argument. See, e.g., Schneider v. 
State, 308 U.S. 147, 150 (1939) (holding that the government cannot ban 
handbills, speech, to vindicate its interest in preventing littering, conduct). The 
expression here is not conduct, it is speech. Images, including photographs, are 
protected by the first Amendment as speech as much as "words in books" and 
"oral utterance[s]." Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 147, 119-20 (1973). P.8. 
The Court held that the law imposed substantial burdens on speech, including the 
right to be anonymous in a sexually explicit photograph; and that the burden was not 
justified by reference to the crime of child abuse that it aimed to prevent. Likewise, 
the regulation (tax) at issue here (and the record keeping requirements which go with 
it) burdens and regulates a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech 
without directly affecting its stated objective - to reduce the problems of sexual 
offenders. Likewise, the burden on speech is not justified by reference to the 
conduct. Even assuming that the State's rationale had some basis (see below), that 
kind of targeting is exactly what the courts have forbidden. Under "strict scrutiny", 
a law is valid only if it imposes the least possible burden on expression. See Sable 
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Communications. Inc. v. FCC. 492 U.S. 115, 126(1989). 
In religious exercise cases, the U.S. Supreme Court previously has used a strict 
scrutiny test to review local laws which infringe on religious freedoms. That test was 
abandoned in Employment Division v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872 (1990), which allowed 
a less stringent test to be used in such cases. Utah courts have apparently retained the 
strict scrutiny test, as enunciated in Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1998). 
Since the free exercise of religion is constitutionally intertwined with free expression, 
Plaintiffs believe that the same test will necessarily be applied in cases such as this. 
Defendant is attempting to impose censorship; and its assertion that its governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression is subterfuge. 
POINT IV 
THE ORDINANCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE INTERMEDIATE 
SCRUTINY TEST OF O'BRIEN. 
The seminal authority for the application of intermediate scrutiny is United 
States, v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In that case, which dealt with the illegal 
destruction of a draft card in an act of civil disobedience, the U.S. Supreme Court 
determined that a general statute regulating behavior may incidentally burden 
expression: 
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if it is within the constitutional power of government; if i t f u r t h e r s an 
important or substantial governmental interest; if governmental interest interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and if the incidental restriction 
on First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance 
of that interest. 391 U.S. at 377. 
The trial Court held that the tax statute at issue here is a proper response to the 
problem of "negative secondary effects" associated by some with adult entertainment. 
The legislature, however, did not aim at such secondary effects; but attempted to tie 
such businesses in with general sexual misconduct in society, with no evidence of 
such a connection. 
The legal concept of "secondary effects" was enunciated in Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, Inc.. 427 U.S. 73 (1976): 
The 1972 ordinances were amendments to an "Anti-Skid Row Ordinance" 
which had been adopted ten years earlier. At that time the Detroit Common 
Council made a finding that some uses of property are especially injurious to 
a neighborhood when they are concentrated in limited areas. The decision to 
add adult Motion picture theaters and adult book stores to a list of businesses 
which apart from a special waiver, could not be located within 1,000 feet of 
two other "regulated uses," was, in part, a response to the significant growth 
in the number os such establishments. In the opinion of urban planners and 
real estate experts who supported the ordinances, the location of several such 
businesses in the same neighborhood tends to attract an undesirable quantity 
and quality of transients, adversely affects property values, causes an increase 
in crime, especially prostitution, and encourages residents and businesses to 
move elsewhere. 427 U.S. at 54-55. 
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The Supreme Court reaffirmed its ruling, and also ruled that one City could rely on 
the experiences of another in fighting such urban blight, in City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986), which is the most frequently cited "secondary 
effects" case: 
The District Court's finding as to the "predominate" intent, left undisturbed by 
the Court of Appeals, is more than adequate to establish that the city's pursuit 
of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 
The Ordinance by its terms is designed to prevent crime, protect the city's 
retail trade, maintain property values, and generally "protec[t] and preserv[e] 
the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, commercial districts, and the quality 
of urban life," not to suppress the expression of unpopular views. 475 U.S. at 
48. 
The Tenth Circuit Court recently, in Heideman v. South Salt Lake City, 348 
F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2003) discussed the necessary record which must accompany an 
ordinance directed at "secondary effects": 
Around 1999, the City Council became concerned about what are called 
'negative secondary effects' - such as crime, prostitution, and lowered property 
values - thought to be associated with sexually oriented businesses. For 
approximately a year, City officials gathered police reports and studies from 
around the country regarding the connection between sexually oriented 
commercial business and these secondary effects. Id. at 1185. 
The Court, in Heideman cited the Supreme Court case of City of Los Angeles v. 
Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002) which held that the City's claim of regulating 
secondary effects must have a valid basis: "the City certainly bears the burden of 
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providing evidence that supports a link between concentrations of adult operations 
and asserted secondary effects". Id at 437. And it allowed an affected business to 
show a lack of such a link: 
This is not to say that the municipality can get away with shoddy data or 
reasoning. The municipality's evidence must fairly support the municipality's 
rationale for its ordinance. If plaintiffs fail to cast doubt on this rationale, 
either by demonstrating that the municipality's evidence does not support its 
rationale or by furnishing evidence that disputes the municipality's factual 
findings, the municipality meets the standard set forth in Renton. If Plaintiffs 
succeed in casting doubt on a municipality's rationale in either manner, the 
burden shifts back to the municipality to supplement the record with evidence 
renewing support for a theory that justifies its ordinance. IdL at 438-39. 
In order to meet this burden, a City enacting a "Sexually Oriented Business" (SOB) 
Ordinance almost universally includes a preamble referring to the secondary effects 
it claims to be battling; and also a list of "studies" and other authorities it relies upon 
in its claim that the Ordinance is a fair attempt to address those effects. The Utah 
legislature made no claim that it was dealing with such secondary effects in its 
proceedings to pass this bill. No references were made to studies, or other authority; 
and no attempt was made to describe the secondary effects or even to refer to them. 
Plaintiffs previously submitted to the District Court, one of those "studies" written 
by one of the most implacable foes of adult businesses in this country: Dr. Richard 
McCleary, a professor of Criminology and Social Ecology at University of California-
4 1 
Irvine. R. 1127-1139. Dr. McCleary has been presented as an expert witness by 
cities across the country to prove that secondary effects exist, and that they must be 
dealt with. His work has been cited by several courts, for good and ill.3 His writing 
frequently refers to the term "ambient crime risk", the term "ambient" meaning 
"surrounding, encircling". American Heritage Dictionary. Houghton Mifflin, New 
York, 1991. Dr. McCleary opines that the secondary effects of an adult business are 
readily apparent for approximately 500 feet, and then rapidly fall off: 
To measure crime risk per unit of time and area, crime incidents reported 
within 500 feet of an SOB (or control) address during a fixed period of time are 
counted. Crime rates calculated this way can be interpreted as crime 
victimization risks.(i.e.„ as the probabilities of victimization) in a circle 
centered on an SOB or control. 
1. While smaller circular areas (e.g.. a 250-foot radius around an SOB 
and/or control) are acceptable in principle, smaller circles often exceed 
the precision for the UCR coding system. 
2. Larger circular areas (e.g.. a 1500-foot radius around an SOB) suffer 
from detectability" problems and tend to "dilute" the estimated effect, 
biasing it towards zero. R. 1130-1131. 
This is not the same phenomenon preached by Defendants. The theory of "secondary 
See Doc to r J o h n ' s ' , I n c . v . C i t y of S ioux C i t y , Iowa, 438 
F . S u p p . 2 d 1005 (N.D. Iowa 2 0 0 6 ) ; A b i l e n e R e t a i l #30 , I n c . v . 
Board of Com' r s of D i c k i n s o n County , Kan . , 492 F . 3 d . 1164 
(10 t h C i r . 2007) and Davtona Grand, I n c . v . C i t y of Davtona 
Beach, F l o r i d a , 490 F .3d 8 6 0 ( l l t h C i r . 2 0 0 7 ) . 
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effects" as accepted by many Federal Courts is confined to a measurable area, and has 
nothing in common with the theory propounded by our legislature. Businesses which 
do not cater to customers on site (escort services where the client meets the escort 
elsewhere) do not have secondary effects. See Voyeur Dorm L.C. v. City of Tampa. 
265 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001). There is no authority whatsoever for regulating adult 
businesses because of the alleged need for sex therapy for some of their customers or 
potential customers. 
Instead, the legislature heard briefly from Ms. Okey and her references to 
"paraphilias". While the bill's sponsor and his cohorts acknowledge that the vast 
majority of people who enjoy adult entertainment are not sex offenders, they made 
totally unsubstantiated claims that a high percentage of sex offenders have some 
history of attending adult entertainment or using the services of escort agencies. The 
Supreme Court, in City of Erie, subjected an anti-nudity ordinance to intermediate 
scrutiny, based on its conclusion that the ordinance was targeted at the "secondary 
effects" associated with nude dancing, and not the message itself: "Put another way, 
the ordinance does not attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, Le^ , 
the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing,. . . ." (Emphasis added) 
529 U.S. at 291. Plaintiffs here are subjected to a substantial tax based on the 
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unsupported allegation that some of those who view nude dancing there might be 
exhibiting a "paraphilia". Ms. Okey seemed pretty sure of herself on this point:" The 
third top factor that indicates a sex offender's risk is paraphilias. Utilizing these types 
ofservices in one example of paraphilias. R.133-134." Her testimony, however, was 
patently false. The authoritative source on such things is the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. Fourth Edition, Text Revision, American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000; known in the profession as DSM-IV-TR. This 
publication defines the term thusly: 
The essential features of a Paraphilia are recurrent, intense sexually arousing 
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 
2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3) children or 
other nonconsenting persons". (IdL, "Sexual and Gender Identity Disorders.") 
Thus while that definition would include Ms. Okey's "anecdotes" involving feathers 
or women's shoes, it would not include "utilizing these type ofservices." Specific 
types of paraphilias identified in the DSM-IV-TR include "exhibitionism" and 
"voyeurism". Voyeurism is defined in § 302.82 as "recurrent, intense sexually 
arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors involving an unsuspecting person who 
is naked, in the process of disrobing, or engaging in sexual activity." (Emphasis 
added). "Accessing stripper bars" simply does not fit into the description of a 
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paraphilia, which by its nature involves "sexual urges or fantasies [which] cause 
marked distress or interpersonal difficulty." Id 
At the Committee hearing on the bill, Ms. Okey did say that there was some 
"anecdotal information" that sex offenders tended to use escort services and "stripper 
bars" more often than others (R. 138). In a battle of anecdotes, many observations 
and accusations can be made. There is recent "anecdotal information" that Catholic 
priests have a particular problem with the youth of their parishes; and the Provo 
Herald, June 13,2004, reported that an Episcopal Bishop had just resigned over a sex 
abuse scandal in his diocese. A few years ago, several newspapers reported that an 
attorney working for a law firm which regularly represented the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints was arrested for soliciting sex from a decoy prostitute in 
South Salt Lake. Recently, the pastor of a large Christian church in Montgomery , 
Alabama apparently asphyxiated himself while attempting to sexually gratify himself 
.
4
 If the Utah legislature reacted to all this bad news with a tax on churches (or only 
those churches where there was recent news of such events), the Courts would 
quickly stop it. Constitutionally, there is no difference between that situation and this 
one. The need for more funds for sex offender therapy does not justify using such a 
4
 Montgomery ( A l a . ) A d v e r t i s e r , June 2007 . 
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wholly unrelated problem as an excuse for censorship. If the State cannot clearly and 
convincingly link the problem and the solution, the tax is unconstitutional. 
The State cannot show any reasonable relationship between the evil sought to 
be ameliorated (sex offenses) and the discriminatory tax that it has imposed on 
protected expression. If common paraphilias include collecting women's shoes or 
feathers (R. 134), neither of which implicates the First Amendment, why does not the 
legislature tax those activities? If the State is claiming a link between the expressive 
activities of Plaintiffs and sex offenses, that is not a "secondary effect". It is not a 
time, place and manner regulation, but a blanket burden or "abridgment" of protected 
speech, and it is aimed at the content of the speech. The sponsor and his witnesses 
cited the need for more treatment; but failed in their attempt to show "cause and 
effect" . 
The challenged tax provisions fail to comport with these requirements in 
several respects. Certainly the State has the power to tax and raise revenue. The need 
for therapy for those who have been convicted of sexual offenses is not in 
controversy. The statute, however, fails both the third and fourth parts of the O'Brien 
test. Suppression of expression is a primary reason for drafting of the law in this 
manner. It is not mainly a revenue raising measure and is not likely to raise very 
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much revenue. Instead, it places a severe burden on one form of protected 
expression. Obviously a broader tax was an option to raise needed treatment funds, 
but the focus of this bill was animus towards a form of entertainment some find 
distasteful. See the comments of Rep. Philpot (Comm. Tr. p 12-13) on the option of 
just banning "pornography, obscenity, these types of things". The Ninth Circuit, in 
Tollis v. San Bernardino County. 827 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1987) outlined the test: 
The district court provided no express finding on the County's predominant 
purpose in passing the ordinance. In the particular case before us, however, we 
need not decide whether the ordinance is content-neutral because we conclude 
that, even if the county's predominant motive was the amelioration of 
secondary effects, the ordinance fails to meet the third prong of the Renton test. 
To be acceptable as a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation, an 
ordinance must be "designed to serve a substantial government interest and 
allow for reasonable alternative avenues of communication." We agree that the 
County has a substantial interest in preventing the deleterious secondary 
effects often associated with adult theaters. At a minimum, however, there 
must be a logical relationship between the evil feared and the method selected 
to combat it. 827 F.2d at 1332, 1333. 
Under "intermediate scrutiny", the State would be required to show some clear 
relationship between this tax and proven harms: and that the measure deals with such 
proven harms to a material degree. Since a more general tax would more easily deal 
with the need for the additional revenue, there was a political decision that "sinners" 
should shoulder the burden. Comments were made on the House floor that this is 
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similar to taxes on beer and cigarettes, which merely pay for the damages done by 
these evil, but legal, materials. R. 120. Unpopular speech is an easy political target; 
but the Constitution does not allow it to be burdened in this manner. The legislature 
may not , for instance, tax publishers over newspaper stories of poor working 
conditions which may precede labor unrest. It would seem to be easy enough to say 
that the press contributed to the cost to taxpayers for police overtime needed to deal 
with the unrest; but such a tax is not permissible. Free expression is not always 
without its social cost; but that cost must be borne by the citizens at large. A tax on 
a point of view is not an option. More direct means are available to deal with the 
need for sex therapy; and O'Brien scrutiny requires them to be used. 
A censorial regulation is not essential if other effective means of control exist. 
In 44 Liquormart the Supreme Court struck down a ban on liquor advertising 
because other methods of directly controlling the adverse effects of increased liquor 
consumption (such as education and market regulation), were plainly known. In just 
such fashion, if the alleged objective is that of providing a needed service to those 
who might otherwise cause societal problems, there is a simple and easily available 
remedy. See also Utah Licensed Beverage Ass'n. v. Leavitt 256 F.3d 1061 (lO^Cir. 
2001) enjoining Utah's advertising restrictions on alcoholic beverages as a violation 
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of the First Amendment. 
Certainly the regulation does not pass the test of "reasonable belief6 imposed 
by Renton and City of Erie. Under Renton v. Playtime Theatres, the challenged 
provisions must be justified as a time, place or manner restriction. In order to fully 
meet the narrow tailoring required by the fourth prong of intermediate scrutiny under 
O'Brien, the incidental restriction must be no greater than is essential and it must 
actually be linked to the achievement of the permitted goal. See Bolger v. Youngs 
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 71 (n. 20) (1983): 'The party seeking to uphold 
a restriction on commercial speech carries the burden of justifying it." See also City 
of Cincinnati v. Discovery Networks, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 113 S.Ct. 1792, 1800 
(1993): "It was the city's burden to establish a 'reasonable fitf between its legitimate 
interests in safety and esthetics and its choice of a limited and selective prohibition 
of news racks as the means chosen to serve those interests." 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to determine that there are no material facts in dispute 
and that the tax levied against these businesses by Title 59, Chapter 27 of the Utah 
Code is an unlawful prior restraint and a violation of Plaintiffs rights to free 
expression under the First Amendment. Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory 
49 
Judgment in their favor. 
DATED this J / ^ day of November, 2007. 
W. ANDREW MCCULLOUGH, L.L.C. 
W. Andrew McCullough 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Addendum A 
Amendment I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Passed by Congress June 13, 1866. Ratified July 9, 1868. 
Note: Article I, section 2, of the Constitution was modified by section 2 of the 14th amendment. 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge 
the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting 
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,* and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be 
reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold 
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as 
a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an 
executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in 
insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a 
vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of 
pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither 
the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or 
rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but ail such debts, 
obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 
* Changed by section 1 of the 26th amendment 
Addendum B 
655 REVENUE AND TAXATION 59-27-101 
(1) collect the tax imposed by Section 59-26-103 from 
the purchaser; and 
(2) remit the tax collected under Subsection (1) to the 
commission: 
(a) quarterly on or before the last day of the month 
immediately following the last day of each calendar 
quarter; and 
(b) on a return prescribed by the commission. 
2004 
59-26-105. Deposit of tax revenue. 
The commission shall deposit revenues generated by the tax 
imposed by this chapter into the General Fund. 2004 
59-26-106. Records. 
(1) A multi-channel video or audio service provider shall 
maintain records, statements, books, or accounts necessary to 
determine the amount of tax that the multi-channel video or 
audio service provider is required to remit to the commission 
under this chapter. 
(2) The commission may require a multi-channel video or 
audio service provider to make or keep the records, state-
ments, books, or accounts the commission considers sufficient 
to show the amount of tax for which the multi-channel video or 
audio service provider is required to remit to the commission 
under this chapter: 
(a) by notice served upon that multi-channel video or 
audio service provider; or 
(b) by administrative rule made in accordance with 
Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking 
Act. 
(3) After notice by the commission, a multi-channel video or 
audio service provider shall open the records, statements, 
books, or accounts specified in Subsection (2) for examination 
by the commission or a duly authorized agent of the commis-
sion. 2004 
59-26-107. Action for collection of tax — Action for 
refund or Credit of tax. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5): 
(a) the commission shall assess a tax under this chap-
ter within three years after a multi-channel video or audio 
service provider files a return; and 
(b) if the commission does not assess a tax under this 
chapter within the three-year period provided in Subsec-
tion (l)(a), the commission may not commence a proceed-
ing to collect the tax. 
(2) The commission may assess a tax at any time if a 
multi-channel video or audio service provider: 
(a) files a false or fraudulent return with intent to 
evade; or 
(b) does not file a return. 
(3) The commission may extend the period to make an 
assessment or to commence a proceeding to collect the tax 
under this chapter if: 
(a) the three-year period under Subsection (1) has not 
expired; and 
(b) the commission and the multi-channel video or 
audio service provider sign a written agreement: 
(i) authorizing the extension; and 
(ii) providing for the length of the extension. 
(4) If the commission delays an audit at the request of a 
multi-channel video or audio service provider, the commission 
may make an assessment as provided in Subsection (5) if: 
(a) the multi-channel video or audio service provider 
subsequently refuses to agree to an extension request by 
the commission; and 
(b) the three-year period under Subsection (1) expires 
before the commission completes the audit. 
(5) An assessment under Subsection (3) shall be: 
(a) for the time period for which the commission could 
not make an assessment because of the expiration of the 
three-year period; and 
(b) in an amount equal to the difference between: 
(i) the commission's estimate of the amount of tax 
the multi-channel video or audio service provider 
would have been assessed for the time period de-
scribed in Subsection (5)(a); and 
(ii) the amount of tax the multi-channel video or 
audio service provider actually paid for the time 
period described in Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), the commis-
sion may not make a credit or refund unless the multi-
channel video or audio service provider files a claim with 
the commission within three years of the date of overpay-
ment. 
(b) The commission shall extend the period for a multi-
channel video or audio service provider to file a claim 
under Subsection (6)(a) if: 
(i) the three-year period under Subsection (6)(a) 
has not expired; and 
(ii) the commission and the multi-channel video or 
audio service provider sign a written agreement: 
(A) authorizing the extension; and 
(B) providing for the length of the extension. 
2004 
59-26-108. Rulemaking authority. 
The commission may make rules in accordance with Title 
63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, to 
implement and enforce this chapter. 2004 
59-26-109. Penalties and interest. 
A multi-channel video or audio service provider that fails to 
comply with any provision of this chapter is subject to penal-
ties and interest as provided in Sections 59-1-401 and 59-1-
402. 2004 
59-26-110. Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee 
study. 
The Revenue and Taxation Interim Committee shall during 
the 2004 interim: 
(1) study the tax imposed by this chapter; 
(2) recommend whether legislation should be drafted to 
modify any provision of this chapter; and 
(3) prepare any legislation tha t the Revenue and Tax-
ation Interim Committee recommends in accordance with 
Subsection (2) for consideration by the Legislature during 
the 2005 General Session. 2004 
CHAPTER 27 
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT BUSINESS AND ESCORT 
SERVICE TAX 
Section 
59-27-101. Title. 
59-27-102. Definitions. 
59-27-103. Tax imposed on a sexually explicit business — 
Tax imposed on an escort service. 
59-27-104. Payment of tax. 
59-27-105. Sexually explicit business and escort service 
fund. 
59-27-106. Records. 
59-27-107. Action for collection of tax — Action for refund 
or credit of tax. 
59-27-108. Penalties and interest. 
59-27-101. Title. 
This chapter is known as the "Sexually Explicit Business 
and Escort Service Tax." 2004 
59-27-102 REVENUE AND TAXATION 656 
59-27-102. Definit ions. 
(1) "Escort" means any individual who is available to the 
public for the purpose of accompanying another individual for: 
(a) companionship; and 
(b) (i) a salary; 
(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; 
(v) profit; or 
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this 
Subsection (l)(b). 
(2) "Escort service" means any person who furnishes or 
arranges for an escort to accompany another individual for: 
(a) companionship; and 
(b) (i) a salary; 
(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; 
(v) profit; or 
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this 
Subsection (2)(b). 
(3) "Nude or partially denuded individual" means an indi-
vidual with any of the following less than completely and 
opaquely covered: 
(a) genitals; 
(b) the pubic region; or 
(c) a female breast below a point immediately above the 
top of the areola. 
(4) "Sexually explicit business" means a business at which 
any nude or partially denuded individual, regardless of 
whether the nude or partially denuded individual is an 
employee of the sexually explicit business or an independent 
contractor, performs any service: 
(a) personally on the premises of the sexually explicit 
business; 
(b) during at least 30 consecutive or nonconsecutive 
days within a calendar year; and 
(c) for: 
(i) a salary; 
(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; 
(v) profit; or 
(vi) any amount similar to an amount listed in this 
Subsection (4)(c). 2004 
59-27-103. Tax imposed on a sexual ly expl ic i t bus iness 
— Tax imposed on an escort service . 
(1) A tax is imposed on a sexually explicit business equal to 
10% of amounts paid to or charged by the sexually explicit 
business for the following transactions: 
(a) an admission fee; 
(b) a user fee; 
(c) a retail sale of tangible personal property made 
within the state; 
(d) a sale of: 
(i) food and food ingredients as defined in Section 
59-12-102; or 
(ii) prepared food as defined in Section 59-12-102; 
(e) a sale of a beverage; and 
(f) any service. 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (2)(b), a tax is 
imposed on an escort service equal to 10% of amounts paid 
or charged by the escort service for any transaction tha t 
involves providing an escort to another individual. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(a), the tax imposed 
by Subsection (2)(a) does not apply to a transaction that is 
subject to the tax imposed in Subsection (1). 
(3) The tax imposed by this section: 
(a) may not be imposed on any sales and use tax 
collected or paid under Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax 
Act; and 
(b) is subject to an agreement sales and use tax under 
Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax Act. 
(4) The commission shall administer this chapter in accor-
dance with Chapter 12, Par t 1, Tax Collection. 2004 
59-27-104. P a y m e n t of tax. 
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), a sexually explicit business or 
escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter shall 
file a return with the commission and pay the tax calculated 
on the return to the commission: 
(a) quarterly on or before the last day of the month 
immediately following the last day of the previous calen-
dar quarter if: 
(i) the sexually explicit business or escort service is 
required to file a quarterly sales and use tax return 
with the commission under Section 59-12-107; or 
(ii) the sexually explicit business or escort service 
is not required to file a sales and use tax return with 
the commission under Chapter 12, Sales and Use Tax 
Act; or 
(b) monthly on or before the last day of the month 
immediately following the last day of the previous calen-
dar month if the sexually explicit business is required to 
file a monthly sales and use tax re turn with the commis-
sion under Section 59-12-108. 
(2) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Admin-
istrative Rulemaking Act, the commission may make rules to: 
(a) establish s tandards for determining whether an 
operation is a sexually explicit business or escort service; 
and 
(b) determine, for purposes of Section 59-27-102, 
amounts tha t are similar to an amount paid for: 
(i) a salary; 
(ii) a fee; 
(iii) a commission; 
(iv) hire; or 
(v) profit. 2004 
59-27-105. Sexually explicit business and escort ser-
vice fund. 
(1) There is created a restricted special revenue fund called 
the "Sexually Explicit Business and Escort Service Fund." 
(2) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (3), the fund con-
sists of all amounts collected by the commission under 
this chapter. 
(b) (i) The monies in the fund shall be invested by the 
state t reasurer pursuant to Title 51, Chapter 7, State 
Money Management Act. 
(ii) All interest or other earnings derived from the 
fund monies shall be deposited in the fund. 
(3) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, 
the commission may retain an amount of tax collected under 
this chapter of not to exceed the lesser of: 
(a) 1.5%; or 
(b) an amount equal to the cost to the commission of 
administering this chapter. 
(4) (a) Fund monies shall be used as provided in this 
Subsection (4). 
(b) The Depar tment of Corrections shall use 60% of the 
monies in the fund, in addition to existing budgets, to 
provide t rea tment services to nonworking or indigent 
adults who: 
(i) have been convicted of an offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Pa r t 4, Sexual Offenses; and 
(ii) are not currently confined or incarcerated in a 
jail or prison. 
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(c) The Adult Probation and Parole section of the De-
partment of Corrections shall use 15% of the monies in 
the fund to provide outpatient treatment services to 
individuals who: 
(i) have been convicted of an offense under Title 76, 
Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses; and 
(ii) are not currently confined or incarcerated in a 
jail or prison. 
(d) The Department of Corrections shall use 10% of the 
monies in the fund, in addition to existing budgets, to 
implement treatment programs for juveniles who have 
been convicted of an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Part 4, Sexual Offenses. 
(e) The attorney general shall use 15% of the monies in 
the fund to provide funding for any task force: 
(i) administered through the Office of the Attorney 
General; and 
(ii) that investigates and prosecutes individuals 
who use the Internet to commit crimes against chil-
dren. 2004 
59-27-106. Records. 
(1) An owner or operator of a sexually explicit business or 
escort service shall maintain records, statements, books, or 
accounts necessary to determine the amount of tax for which 
the owner or operator is liable to pay under this chapter. 
(2) The commission may require an owner or operator of a 
sexually explicit business or escort service, by notice served on 
the person, to make or keep the records, statements, books, or 
accounts described in Subsection (1) in a manner in which the 
commission considers sufficient to show the amount of tax for 
which the owner or operator is liable to pay under this chapter. 
(3) After notice by the commission, the owner or operator of 
a sexually explicit business or escort service shall open the 
records, statements, books, or accounts specified in this sec-
tion for examination by the commission or an authorized 
agent of the commission. 2004 
59-27-107. Action for collection of tax — Action for 
refund or credit of tax. 
(1) (a) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5), 
the commission shall assess a tax under this chapter 
within three years after a sexually explicit business or 
escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter 
files a return. 
(b) Except as provided in Subsections (2) through (5), if 
the commission does not assess a tax under this chapter 
within the three-year period provided in Subsection (l)(a), 
the commission may not commence a proceeding to collect 
the tax. 
(2) The commission may assess a tax at any time if a 
sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax 
imposed by this chapter: 
(a) files a false or fraudulent return with intent to 
evade; or 
(b) does not file a return. 
(3) The commission may extend the period to make an 
assessment or to commence a proceeding to collect the tax 
under this chapter if: 
(a) the three-year period under Subsection (1) has not 
expired; and 
(b) the commission and the sexually explicit business 
or escort service subject to the tax imposed by this chapter 
sign a written agreement: 
(i) authorizing the extension; and 
(ii) providing for the length of the extension. 
(4) If the commission delays an audit at the request of a 
sexually explicit business or escort service subject to the tax 
imposed by this chapter, the commission may make an assess-
ment as provided in Subsection (5) if: 
(a) the sexually explicit business or escort service sub-
ject to the tax imposed by this chapter subsequently 
refuses to agree to an extension request by the commis-
sion; and 
(b) the three-year period under Subsection (1) expires 
before the commission completes the audit. 
(5) An assessment under Subsection (4) shall be: 
(a) for the time period for which the commission could 
not make an assessment because of the expiration of the 
three-year period; and 
(b) in an amount equal to the difference between: 
(i) the commission's estimate of the amount of tax 
the sexually explicit business or escort service subject 
to the tax imposed by this chapter would have been 
assessed for the time period described in Subsection 
(5)(a); and 
(ii) the amount of tax the sexually explicit business 
or escort service subject to the tax imposed by this 
chapter actually paid for the time period described in 
Subsection (5)(a). 
(6) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (6)(b), the commis-
sion may not make a credit or refund unless the sexually 
explicit business or escort service subject to the tax 
imposed by this chapter files a claim with the commission 
within three years of the date of overpayment. 
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), the commission 
shall extend the period for a taxpayer to file a claim under 
Subsection (6)(a) if: 
(i) the three-year period under Subsection (6)(a) 
has not expired; and 
(ii) the commission and the sexually explicit busi-
ness or escort service subject to the tax imposed by 
this chapter sign a written agreement: 
(A) authorizing the extension; and 
(B) providing for the length of the extension. 
2004 
59-27-108. Penalties and interest. 
An owner or operator of a sexually explicit business or escort 
service that fails to comply with this chapter is subject to: 
(1) penalties provided in Section 59-1-401; and 
(2) interest provided in Section 59-1-402. 2004 
TITLE 60 
SALES [REPEALED] 
TITLE 61 
SECURITIES DIVISION — REAL ESTATE 
DIVISION 
Chapter 
1. Utah Uniform Securities Act. 
2. Division of Real Estate. 
2a. Real Estate Recovery Fund. 
2b. Real Estate Appraiser Licensing and Certification. 
2c. Utah Residential Mortgage Practices Act. 
2d. Utah High Cost Home Loan Act. 
3. Securities and Securities Transfer Agents [Repealed]. 
4. Take-Over Offers for Equity Securities [Repealed]. 
5. Corporate Take-Overs [Repealed]. 
6. Control Shares Acquisitions Act. 
CHAPTER 1 
UTAH UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT 
Section 
61-1-1. 
61-1-2. 
Fraud unlawful. 
Investment adviser - • Unlawful acts. 
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Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, makes an order 
requiring a parent to furnish support or necessary food, 
clothing, shelter, medical care, or other remedial care for his 
child, and the parent fails to do so, proof of noncompliance 
shall be prima facie evidence of contempt of court. 
(2) Proof of noncompliance may be demonstrated by show-
ing that: 
(a) the order was made, and filed with the district 
court; and 
(b) the parent knew of the order because: 
(i) the order was mailed to the parent at his 
last-known address as shown on the court records; 
(ii) the parent was present in court at the time the 
order was pronounced; 
(iii) the parent entered into a written stipulation 
and the parent or counsel for the parent was sent a 
copy of the order; 
(iv) counsel was present in court and entered into 
a stipulation which was accepted and the order based 
upon the stipulation was then sent to counsel for the 
parent; or 
(v) the parent was properly served and failed to 
answer. 
(3) Upon establishment of a prima facie case of contempt 
under Subsection (2), the obligor under the child support order 
has the burden of proving inability to comply with the child 
support order. 
(4) A court may, in addition to other available sanctions, 
withhold, suspend, or restrict the use of driver's licenses, 
professional and occupational licenses, and recreational li-
censes and impose conditions for reinstatement upon a finding 
that: 
(a) an obligor has: 
(i) made no payment for 60 days on a current 
obligation of support as set forth in an administrative 
or court order and, -thereafter, has failed to make a 
good faith effort under the circumstances to make 
payment on the support obligation in accordance with 
the order; or 
(ii) made no payment for 60 days on an arrearage 
obligation of support as set forth in a payment sched-
ule, written agreement with the Office of Recovery 
Services, or an administrative or judicial order and, 
thereafter, has failed to make a good faith effort 
under the circumstances to make payment on the 
arrearage obligation in accordance with the payment 
schedule, agreement, or order; and 
(iii) not obtained a judicial order staying enforce-
ment of the support or arrearage obligation for which 
the obligor would be otherwise delinquent; 
(b) a custodial parent has: 
(i) violated a parent-time order by denying contact 
for 60 days between a noncustodial parent and a child 
and, thereafter, has failed to make a good faith effort 
under the circumstances to comply with a parent-
time order; and 
(ii) not obtained a judicial order staying enforce-
ment of the parent-time order; or 
(c) an obligor or obligee, after receiving appropriate 
notice, has failed to comply with a subpoena or order 
relating to a paternity or child support proceeding. 2001 
CHAPTER 33 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 
Section 
78-33-1. Jurisdiction of district courts — Form — Effect. 
78-33-2. Rights, s tatus, legal relations under instruments 
or s tatutes may be determined. 
Section 
78-33-3. 
78-33-4. 
78-33-5. 
78-33-6. 
78-33-7. 
78-33-8. 
78-33-9. 
78-33-10. 
78-33-11. 
78-33-12. 
78-33-13. 
Contracts. 
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Court's general powers. 
Discretion to deny declaratory relief. 
Appeals and reviews. 
Supplemental relief. 
Trial of issues of fact. 
Costs. 
Parties. 
Chapter to be liberally construed. 
"Person'' defined. 
78-33-1. Jur i sd ic t ion of district courts — Form — Ef-
fect. 
The district courts within their respective jurisdictions shall 
have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, 
whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. No action 
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a 
declaratory judgment or decree is prayed for. The declaration 
may be either affirmative or negative in form and effect; and 
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final 
judgment or decree. 1953 
78-33-2. Rights , s tatus , legal relat ions under instru-
ments or s tatutes may be determined. 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, 
or whose rights, s ta tus or other legal relations are affected by 
a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or franchise, may 
have determined any question of construction or validity 
arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract or 
franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other 
legal relations thereunder. 1953 
78-33-3. Contracts . 
A contract may be construed either before or after there has 
been a breach thereof. 1953 
78-33-4. Suit by fiduciary or representative. 
Any person interested as or through an executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary, creditor, devisee, 
legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que trust, in the adminis-
tration of a trust, or of the estate of a decedent, an infant, 
lunatic or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or legal 
relations in respect thereto: 
(1) to ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, lega-
tees, heirs, next of kin or others; or, 
(2) to direct the executors, administrators or trustees 
to do or abstain from doing any particular act in their 
fiduciary capacity; or, 
(3) to determine any question arising in the adminis-
tration of the estate or trust, including questions of 
construction of wills and other writings. 1953 
78-33-5. Court's general powers . 
The enumeration in Sections 78-33-2, 78-33-3 and 78-33-4 
does not limit or restrict the exercise of the general powers 
conferred in Section 78-33-1 in any proceeding where declara-
tory relief is sought, in which a judgment or decree will 
terminate the controversy or remove an uncertainty. 1953 
78-33-6. Discret ion to deny declaratory relief. 
The court may refuse to render or enter a declaratory 
judgment or decree where such judgment or decree, if ren-
dered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding. 1953 
78-33-7. Appeals and reviews . 
All orders, judgments and decrees under this chapter may 
be reviewed as other orders, judgments and decrees. 1953 
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78-33-8. Supplemental relief. 
Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree 
may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The applica-
tion therefor shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction 
to grant the relief. If the application is deemed sufficient, the 
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party, 
whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judg-
ment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be 
granted forthwith. 1953 
78-33-9. Trial of i s sues of fact. 
When a proceeding under this chapter involves the deter-
mination of an issue of fact, such issue may be tried and 
determined in the same manner as issues of fact are tried and 
determined in other civil actions in the court in which the 
proceeding is pending. 1953 
78-33-10. Cos ts . 
In any proceeding under this chapter the court may make 
such award of costs as may seem equitable and just . 1953 
78-33-11. Part ies . 
When declaratory relief is sought all persons shall be made 
parties who have or claim any interest which would be 
affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice 
the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any 
proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal or 
county ordinance or franchise such municipality or county 
shall be made a party, and shall be entitled to be heard, and if 
a statute or state franchise or permit is alleged to be invalid 
the attorney general shall be served with a copy of the 
proceeding and be entitled to be heard. 1953 
78-33-12. Chapter to be liberally^ construed. 
This chapter is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to 
settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with 
respect to rights, s tatus and other legal relations; and is to be 
liberally construed and administered. 1953 
78-33-13. "Person" defined. 
The word " p e r s o n " wherever used in this chapter, shall be 
construed to mean any person, partnership, joint stock com-
pany, unincorporated association or society, or municipal or 
other corporation of any character whatsoever. 1953 
CHAPTER 34 
EMINENT DOMAIN 
Section 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
78-34-2. Estates and rights t ha t may be taken. 
78-34-3. Private property which may be taken. 
78-34-4. Conditions precedent to taking. 
78-34-5. Right of entry for survey and location. 
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paid into court — Procedure for payment of 
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78-34-10. Compensation and damages — How assessed. 
78-34-11. When right to damages deemed to have accrued. 
78-34-12. When title sought found defective — Another 
action allowed. 
78-34-13. Payment of award — Bond from railroad to 
secure fencing. 
78-34-14. Distribution of award — Execution — Annul-
ment of proceedings on failure to pay. 
78-34-15. Judgment of condemnation — Recordation — 
Effect. 
Section 
78-34-16. 
78-34-17. 
78-34-18. 
78-34-19. 
78-34-20. 
78-34-21. 
Substitution ofbond for deposit paid into court — 
Abandonment of action by condemner — Con-
ditions of dismissal. 
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acquiring. 
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commence or complete construction within rea-
sonable time. 
Sale of property acquired by eminent domain. 
Dispute resolution. 
78-34-1. Uses for which right may be exercised. 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter, the right of emi-
nent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public 
uses: 
(1) All public uses authorized by the Government of the 
United States. 
(2) Public buildings and grounds for the use of the 
state, and ail other public uses authorized by the Legis-
lature. 
(3) Public buildings and grounds for the use of any 
county, city or incorporated town, or board of education; 
reservoirs, canals, aqueducts, flumes, ditches, or pipes for 
conducting water for the use of the inhabitants of any 
county or city or incorporated town, or for the draining of 
any county, city or incorporated town; the raising of the 
banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and 
widening, deepening or straightening their channels; 
roads, streets and alleys; and all other public uses for the 
benefit of any county, city or incorporated town, or the 
inhabitants thereof. 
(4) Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms, ferries, 
bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads, 
roads for transportation by traction engines or road 
locomotives, roads for logging or lumbering purposes, and 
railroads and street railways for public transportation. 
(5) Reservoirs, dams, watergates, canals, ditches, 
flumes, tunnels, aqueducts and pipes for the supplying of 
persons, mines, mills, smelters or other works for the 
reduction of ores, with water for domestic or other uses, or 
for irrigation purposes, or for the draining and reclaiming 
of lands, or for the floating of logs and lumber on streams 
not navigable, or for solar evaporation ponds and other 
facilities for the recovery of minerals in solution. 
(6) Roads, railroads, tramways, tunnels, ditches, 
flumes, pipes and dumping places to facilitate the milling, 
smelting or other reduction of ores, or the working of 
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including 
minerals in solution; outlets, natural or otherwise, for the 
deposit or conduct of tailings, refuse or water from mills, 
smelters or other works for the reduction of ores, or from 
mines, quarries, coal mines or mineral deposits including 
minerals in solution; mill dams; gas, oil or coal pipelines, 
tanks or reservoirs, including any subsurface stratum or 
formation in any land for the underground storage of 
natural gas, and in connection therewith such other 
interests in property as may be required adequately to 
examine, prepare, maintain, and operate such under-
ground natural gas storage facilities; and solar evapora-
tion ponds and other facilities for the recovery of minerals 
in solution; also any occupancy in common by the owners 
or possessors of different mines, quarries, coal mines, 
mineral deposits, mills, smelters, or other places for the 
reduction of ores, or any place for the flow, deposit or 
conduct of tailings or refuse matter. 
(7) Byroads leading from highways to residences and 
farms. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
BUSHCO, d.b.a. Babydolls Escorts, 
VALLEY RECREATION, Inc. d.b.a. Kitty's 
Escort and Angel's Escort, THE D. HOUSE, 
LLC d.b.a. The Doll House 
Plaintiffs, 
AMERICAN BUSH, INC. and DENALI, 
LLC, d.b.a. SOUTHERN EXPOSURE, 
Plaintiffs in Intervention, 
v. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION and 
PAM HENDRICKSON, R. BRUCE 
JOHNSON, PALMER DEPAULIS, and 
MARK B. JOHNSON, in their official 
capacities, as members of the Utah State Tax 
Commission 
Defendants. 
FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 040911691 
Judge Medley 
1*7/0/ A 
FILEB BISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
74 s 
JUL - 3 2007 
I* LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
On June 4, 2007, before the Honorable Tyrone Medley, Plaintiffs' and Defendants' cross 
motions for summary judgment came before this court for oral argument. Andrew McCullough 
appeared on behalf of Plaintiffs and Susan L. Barnum and Jaysen R. Oldroyd, Assistant Utah 
Attorneys General, appeared on behalf of Defendants. 
The Court heard oral argument on both Motions, considered the written Memoranda filed 
by both parties, reviewed the file, and made an oral ruling on the record on June 5, 2007; based 
thereon the Court now makes the following conclusions of law, based on the undisputed material 
facts. 
1. The escort service Plaintiffs are entitled to First Amendment protection because they 
incorporate dancing services; thus for purposes of these cross-motions all the Plaintiffs 
will be treated as if they are entitled to the same First Amendment protection. 
2. The sexually explicit business tax set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 59-27-101 et. seq. is 
content-neutral for First Amendment purposes because it falls on any business involving 
nudity in its services. 
3. The sexually explicit business tax and the escort service tax are content-neutral, and the 
test for content-neutral laws that impact expressive conduct such as nude dancing set 
forth in O'Brien v. United States, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) applies. The statute meets the 
four O'Brien prongs as follows: 
a. First, the legislature has the power to enact this law. The state can impose taxes 
and this prong is not in dispute. 
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b. Second, the law furthers a substantial government interest. As stated in the 
statute, the purpose of the tax is to raise revenue for sex offender treatment. The 
Legislature heard evidence that there is insufficient funding for sex offender 
treatment and sex offender recidivism rates are high without treatment and these 
reasons constitute a substantial government interest. 
c. Third, the tax and statute is unrelated to the suppression of the expression that 
may be affected because seeking additional sex offender treatment funding is 
unrelated to the suppression of expression. Based on the evidence before the 
legislature the tax is designed to address negative secondary effects. 
d. Fourth, the impact of the statute is not greater than necessary to achieve the 
desired result because the impact is de minimis; the restriction is not a complete 
restriction on nude dancing but only a 10% tax on conduct involving nudity, and 
so is no greater than necessary. 
4. The tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services does not violate the First 
Amendment. 
5. The tax on sexually explicit businesses and escort services also does not violate the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it does not affect 
fundamental rights, and the statute has a rational basis, which serves a substantial and 
legitimate government purpose of crime prevention by funding sex offender treatment. 
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6. Based on these conclusions, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
7. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendants. 
DATED this 3 day of , 2007. 
BY THE COURT: 
TyroneMedley 
ThirdUJistnct Court Judge 
^r~*^ * * * . 
Approved as to Fo 
Andrew McCimbugh 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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I hereby certify that on this ^—'-> day of June, 2007,1 caused to be served by U.S. mail, 
postage pre-paid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINAL JUDGMENT AND ORDER 
GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING 
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following: 
W ANDREW MCCULLOUGH 
MCCULLOUGH & ASSOCIATES LLC 
6885 SOUTH STATE STREET SUITE 200 
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By Interoffice Mail to: 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
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